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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________________________________________ 
 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 David L. Nahodil, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order 
of the district court summarily denying his motion brought pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to set aside his conviction of using a firearm 
during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1),   on the ground that his counsel was ineffective at a 
guilty plea hearing.  The appeal turns on the distinction between 
the meaning of "prejudice to the government" in two contexts: (1) a 
§ 2255 motion involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
in the plea proceeding; and (2) a proceeding to withdraw a guilty 
plea in the underlying criminal case.  We conclude just as in 
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264-65, 106 S. Ct. 617, 624 
(1986), which dealt with proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, that 
the appropriate prejudice determination under § 2255 (where 
ineffective assistance of counsel is claimed) encompasses not the 
government's facility in retrying the petitioner -- an important 
consideration in proceedings to withdraw the guilty plea -- but only 
its capacity to respond suitably to the petition.  Because the 
district court applied the wrong standard, and because the record 
does not show conclusively that Nahodil is not entitled to relief, 
  
we will vacate the district court's order and remand for a hearing 
on the § 2255 motion. 
 
I. 
 In May 1991, Nahodil pled guilty to the firearms charge.  
On June 14, 1991, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea.  Although 
the district court found fair and just reasons to allow Nahodil to 
withdraw his plea, it denied his motion because of its conclusion 
that the government would be prejudiced due to the intervening death 
of the government's key witness, and sentenced him to sixty months 
imprisonment.  See United States v. Nahodil, 776 F. Supp. 991, 996 
(M.D. Pa. 1991).  We affirmed both rulings in an unpublished 
opinion.  See 972 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 672 
(1992). 
 Nahodil, who is currently serving a state sentence and has 
not yet begun serving his federal sentence, moved under § 2255 to 
vacate the guilty plea.  The district court dismissed the § 2255 
motion without ordering a response or a hearing, and certified, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), that any appeal would be deemed 
frivolous and not taken in good faith.  Nahodil filed a timely 
notice of appeal.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1291 and 2253. 
 The discretion of the district court summarily to dismiss 
a motion brought under § 2255 is limited to cases where the motion, 
files, and records "`show conclusively that the movant is not 
entitled to relief.'"  United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 41-42 (3d 
  
Cir. 1992) (quoting Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d 
Cir. 1989)).  We review the district court's decision to do so for 
abuse of discretion.  See id. 
 Nahodil's principal claim is that his counsel was 
ineffective for improperly advising him to enter a plea of guilty 
despite his repeated objections to doing so.1  A § 2255 motion is a 
proper and indeed the preferred vehicle for a federal prisoner to 
allege ineffective assistance of counsel.  See United States v. 
Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311-12 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 
1089, 110 S. Ct. 1831 (1990); cf. United States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 
100, 103-04 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that in a § 2255 motion alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel the petitioner need not first 
raise the issue on direct appeal and need not show "cause and 
prejudice"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1544 (1994).  To show that 
ineffective assistance of counsel made his or her guilty plea 
involuntary, the movant must show that (i) his or her counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases; and (ii) there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she 
would have proceeded to trial instead of pleading guilty.  See Hill 
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369-70 (1985). 
 
                     
    
1
.      Nahodil raises additional claims of ineffective assis-
tance, but because we are remanding the case to the district court, 
we express no opinion as to their merits. 
  
II. 
 The record substantiates Nahodil's claim that he was quite 
reluctant to plead guilty.  First, he did not want to admit at the 
plea hearing that he used a gun "during and in relation to a drug 
trafficking offense."  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (emphasis supplied).  
Second, he interrupted the hearing numerous times to confer with his 
attorney.  Third, Nahodil experienced great difficulty with his 
decision to plead guilty, see Nahodil, 776 F. Supp. at 992-93, 996, 
and at one point during the plea hearing he attempted to enter a 
plea of nolo contendere, which the district court rejected. 
 Nahodil's reluctance to plead guilty and his claim to 
innocence may have a substantial basis in fact.  He protests that he 
retrieved the firearm, a combination rifle/shotgun stashed in a wall 
rack, as a conversation piece rather than to threaten anyone, and 
that its retrieval had no relation to the drug transaction, which 
involved acquaintances in a small rural city.  Indeed, when denying 
the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the district court observed 
that "although it appears that circumstances surrounding Nahodil's 
possession of the . . . firearm . . . would be sufficient to support 
a jury verdict against him . . ., a jury could still acquit Nahodil 
of the charge if it found his explanation credible."  Nahodil, 776 
F. Supp. at 996.  Nevertheless, in the order denying the § 2255 
motion, the district court stated that, "[r]egardless of the advice 
of counsel, petitioner made a knowing and voluntary plea."  Order at 
2 (July 15, 1993). 
  
 Under the Hill v. Lockhart standard, see supra at Error! 
Bookmark not defined., the quality of the advice that Nahodil's 
counsel gave him during the plea hearing determines the 
voluntariness of his guilty plea.  The record at this stage does not 
disclose what that advice was.  It does impart, however, that 
Nahodil's attorney did not request a continuance despite Nahodil's 
oft repeated protestations of innocence and his considerable 
reluctance to plead guilty, and that his attorney did not ask to 
confer with him after the court rejected his plea of nolo 
contendere.  Thus, the brief record does not preclude a finding that 
the content of his counsel's advice fell below the range of 
competence demanded of criminal defense counsel.  Accordingly, 
unless the appeal may be disposed of on the prejudice prong, see 
infra, we are constrained to hold that the court abused its 
discretion by precipitously denying the § 2255 motion without first 
holding a hearing to find the relevant facts, see United States v. 
Giardino, 797 F.2d 30, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1986). 
 
  
III. 
A. 
 If the district court determines that Nahodil's attorney's 
advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, it must 
next determine whether that infirm advice prejudiced Nahodil.  Hill, 
474 U.S. at 58-59, 106 S. Ct. at 370.  Prejudice results from 
ineffective assistance of counsel at a plea hearing if there was a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant 
would not have pled guilty but instead would have insisted on 
proceeding to trial.  See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370. 
 Nahodil's claim that "defense counsel improperly advised 
[him] to enter a plea of guilt[y] to the charges despite petition-
er's repeated objections to doing so, and with clear understanding 
that [he] would not agree to admit his guilt to the charges," 
implies that he would have proceeded to trial had his attorney not 
advised him to plead guilty.  As we have noted, his presently 
asserted desire to have stood trial has a plausible foundation in 
the record, meaning that we can not rule out that there was a 
reasonable probability that but for his counsel's allegedly 
constitutionally deficient advice he would have proceeded to trial.  
He has therefore alleged the requisite prejudice to himself to 
warrant a hearing on his § 2255 motion.  We turn to the question of 
prejudice to the government. 
 
  
B. 
 Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings 
provides: 
 
 Delayed Motions.  A motion for relief made pursuant to 
these rules may be dismissed if it appears that the gov-
ernment has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to 
the motion by delay in its filing unless the movant shows 
that it is based on grounds of which he could not have had 
knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before 
the circumstances prejudicial to the government occurred.
  
A § 2255 motion is the federal equivalent of a state habeas petition 
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  The language of Rule 9(a) 
pertaining to prejudice to the government tracks that of Rule 9(a) 
of the Rules Governing § 2254 Proceedings.  In a habeas proceeding 
under § 2254, the appropriate prejudice determination does not 
encompass the government's facility in retrying the petitioner, but 
just embraces its capacity to respond suitably to the petition.  See 
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264-65, 106 S. Ct. 617, 624 
(1986).   
 Because, as indicated, the two versions of Rule 9(a) are 
practically indistinguishable, the discussion in Vasquez regarding 
the suitable inquiry as to prejudice to the government applies to 
both federal and state habeas petitions.  Cf., e.g., Reed v. Farley, 
114 S. Ct. 2291, 2299-300 (1994) (stating that "`§ 2255 was intended 
to mirror § 2254 in operative effect'" (quoting Davis v. United 
States, 417 U.S. 333, 344, 94 S. Ct. 2298, 2304 (1974))); Kaufman v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224-27, 89 S. Ct. 1068, 1073-74 (1969) 
(applying precedent under § 2254 to a § 2255 proceeding); United 
  
States v. Gutierrez, 839 F.2d 648, 650 (10th Cir. 1988) (same).  
Thus, prejudice to the government's ability to retry the case is not 
a consideration when ruling upon a § 2255 motion.  See Heflin v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 415, 420, 79 S. Ct. 451, 454 (1959) 
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("[A]s in habeas corpus, [under § 2255] 
there is no statute of limitations, no res judicata, and . . . the 
doctrine of laches is inapplicable." (emphasis supplied)). 
 The government counters with a reference to a portion of 
the advisory committee's note to Rule 9 of the Rules Governing § 
2255 Proceedings, where it states that "[s]ubdivision (a) provides a 
flexible, equitable time limitation based on laches to prevent 
movants from withholding their claims so as to prejudice the 
government both in meeting the allegations in the motion and in any 
possible retrial."  RULE 9 OF THE RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 
advisory committee's note -- 1976 adoption (emphasis supplied).  
Although advisory committee notes are due some deference, see 
Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2385 (1986), 
they cannot be allowed to contradict the express language of a Rule 
and its authorizing statute, cf. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic 
Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 111 S. Ct. 922, 928 
(1991) (holding that courts are to "`give the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure their plain meaning'" (quoting Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel 
Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123, 110 S. Ct. 456, 458 
(1989))).   
 The statute provides that "[a] motion for relief may be 
made at any time."  28 U.S.C. § 2255 (emphasis supplied).  Rule 9(a) 
  
somewhat constricts the statute's categorical language, proclaiming 
that "[a] motion made pursuant to these rules may be dismissed if it 
appears that the government has been prejudiced in its ability to 
respond to the motion by delay in its filing . . . ."  RULE 9 OF THE 
RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS.  But neither the rule nor the statute 
abridges a prisoner's right to file a petition because of prejudice 
to the government's case in a retrial, and we are not free to weave 
such an exception out of whole cloth, the advisory committee's note 
notwithstanding.2 
 The government also asserts that § 2255 motions should be 
treated differently from § 2254 petitions with respect to the 
prejudice inquiry because (i) a § 2255 motion may be made "at any 
time," 28 U.S.C. § 2255; (ii) a § 2254 petition is a separate civil 
action whereas a § 2255 motion is a further step in the criminal 
process, see RULE 1 OF THE RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS advisory 
committee's note -- 1976 adoption; and (iii) the remedies available 
under a § 2255 motion include ordering a new trial, compare 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2241-54 (speaking in terms of the court "issuing the 
writ") with 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (authorizing the court to "discharge 
                     
    
2
.    The tension between the advisory committee's note and the 
text of Rule 9(a) may possibly be understood by reference to the 
legislative history of Rule 9(a).  Apparently the note was drafted 
and submitted to Congress along with the proposed Rule 9(a) in 1976.  
But Congress altered the proposed Rule, striking language that would 
have created a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the government 
if five years had passed prior to the petition being brought.  See 
H.R. REP. No. 1471, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2478, 2481; Gutierrez, 839 F.2d at 650.  Yet the note 
apparently was not amended to reflect this evolution of the Rule's 
text.  Moreover, the advisory committee's note was drafted before 
the Supreme Court's decision in Vasquez, supra. 
  
the prisoner[,] resentence him[,] grant a new trial[,] or correct 
the sentence").  These arguments are unavailing.  
 With respect to the argument based on the lack of a 
statute of limitations for § 2255 proceedings, the same has 
universally been held true of § 2254 petitions.  See, e.g., Vasquez, 
474 U.S. at 265, 106 S. Ct. at 624; Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. 
Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 123, 76 S. Ct. 223, 227 (1956); Campas v. 
Zimmerman, 876 F.2d 318, 325 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[D]elay without more 
[i]s insufficient to warrant a Rule 9(a) dismissal."); United States 
v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 1963).  Considering next the 
argument that a § 2254 petition is a separate civil proceeding 
whereas a § 2255 proceeding is a continuation of the criminal trial, 
we understand the difference to have arisen in 1948 due to the 
Judicial Conference's urging that the administration of habeas 
corpus proceedings in federal courts would be simplified if the 
proceeding could be brought in the sentencing court instead of the 
court of the district where the prisoner was confined.  See Kaufman, 
394 U.S. at 221-22, 89 S. Ct. at 1071.  The change "was intended 
simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly 
commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas 
corpus."  Id. at 222, 89 S. Ct. at 1071 (quoting Hill v. United 
States, 368 U.S. 424, 427, 82 S. Ct. 468, 471 (1962)) (emphasis 
supplied).  Thus, this distinction in the form of the proceedings 
has no substantive repercussions. 
 Finally, as to the government's argument premised on the 
supposed distinction in remedies available in § 2254 petitions vis-
  
à-vis § 2255 proceedings, it may be true that, on its face, § 2255 
authorizes broader relief than § 2254.  This distinction is not 
genuine, however, because federal courts may condition relief under 
§ 2254 on various grounds, including on the state affording the 
prisoner a new trial.  See, e.g., Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 301 
(3d Cir. 1988) (conditioning issuance of the writ on the state 
appellate court reinstating the petitioner's appeal within 30 days); 
Carter v. Rafferty, 781 F.2d 993, 998 n.6 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting the 
"customary approach [of] issuing a writ only after a 60 or 90 day 
period for the State to commence new trial proceedings"), overruled 
on other grounds by Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 107 S. Ct. 
2113 (1987).  Thus, none of the government's contentions points to a 
material distinction between the two types of proceedings. 
 Of course, insofar as § 2255 proceedings are governed by 
equitable principles, a petitioner's inexcusable delay predating the 
loss of weighty evidence which causes the government prejudice in 
its ability to retry the petitioner may have a bearing on the 
prisoner's burden of proof during the proceedings, and may be 
appropriate for a district court to consider in deciding whether to 
exercise its discretion to grant a § 2255 motion.  See, e.g., 
Cariola, 323 F.2d at 183 ("Although the passage of many years will 
not cure a conviction if it is void, a defendant who, knowing of his 
right to relief from a conviction, waits to apply for it until all 
witnesses have died, will have a heavy burden of proof with respect 
to the facts on which the relief must rest.").3  This is because the 
                     
    
3
.    Cariola cited United States v. Morgan, 222 F.2d 673, 675 
(2d Cir. 1955) and Farnsworth v. United States, 232 F.2d 59, 63 
  
prejudice to the government's ability to retry the petitioner and 
prejudice to its ability to respond suitably to the petition will 
overlap in some cases.  In this case, however, Nahodil, a pro se 
litigant "who is not skilled in the arts and sciences of law," acted 
fairly promptly after his conviction to obtain collateral relief:  
he filed his § 2255 motion less than 13 months after this Court 
(..continued) 
(D.C. Cir. 1956) for that proposition.  In Farnsworth, the District 
of Columbia Circuit stated: 
 
 If a defendant without good reason waits a long time 
before asserting his claimed right, with the consequence 
that many witnesses are dead, he might have difficulty 
maintaining his burden of proof, or a heavier burden of 
proof may be imposed upon him.  See Morgan, 222 F.2d at 
675.  But where the fundamental constitutional right has 
been denied, an accused should not be precluded from 
relief because he cannot satisfy a court that he had good 
cause for any delay in seeking it.  "To permit a defense 
of laches to the writ would, in effect, denude it of one 
of its essential characteristics -- the power to hurdle a 
time factor."  Haywood v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 485, 
488 (S.D.N.Y.). 
Id. at 63.  Morgan voiced a similar opinion: 
 It may be that, if a defendant, knowing of his to obtain 
relief from . . . a [void] conviction, waited to apply for 
it until all witnesses other than the defendant have died, 
he would have a very heavy burden of proof with respect to 
the facts on which such relief must rest.  However, we 
need not here so decide. 
Id. at 675.  We note that Farnsworth, Morgan, and Cariola were all 
petitions for a writ of coram nobis, not § 2255 proceedings, and 
could be distinguished on that ground, since coram nobis precedent 
is not binding in § 2255 proceedings.  See United States v. Morgan, 
346 U.S. 502, 74 S. Ct. 247 (1954).  However, insofar as all these 
cases were addressing the question of laches in collateral relief 
proceedings, they would seem to be quite persuasive in § 2255 
proceedings. 
  
affirmed his sentence.4  If the district court were to find this 
delay not to be undue, prejudice to the government in the § 2255 
proceeding would be irrelevant to the merits of his § 2255 motion. 
 In any event, collateral relief would not be barred in 
this case even assuming Nahodil's delay in filing his § 2255 motion 
were undue and the government's prejudice in retrying Nahodil were a 
relevant consideration in a § 2255 proceeding, since the 
government's alleged prejudice in retrying Nahodil is not causally 
related to that delay, the government's key witness having died 
before completion of the primary proceedings.  See RULE 9(A) OF THE 
RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS (providing that delay causing prejudice 
may not be a cause for dismissal of a § 2255 motion if the movant 
                     
    
4
.    Nahodil is a blameless petitioner (in terms of dilatory 
conduct as described in the text), and thus we need not elaborate 
here on the contours of the law in a case where the petitioner is 
blameworthy.  Presumably, once the government has made a showing of 
prejudice attributable to petitioner's delay, "`the burden shifts to 
the petitioner to show either that the state actually is not preju-
diced or that petitioner's delay is "based on grounds which he could 
not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence 
before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred."'"  
Gutierrez, 839 F.2d at 652 (quoting McDonnell v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 
246, 251 (5th Cir. 1982)).  Perhaps if the petitioner fails to meet 
that burden, his or her uncorroborated testimony would rarely be 
enough to warrant setting aside a conviction:  since his or her 
unreasonable conduct has resulted in the unavailability of witness-
es, the destruction of documents, or other prejudice to the govern-
ment, he or she cannot in equity benefit therefrom.  Alternatively 
or additionally, the court could apply a clear and convincing 
standard of proof to the petitioner to make up for the petitioner's 
undue delay.  Cf. Klein v. United States, 880 F.2d 250, 254 (10th 
Cir. 1989) (holding that laches barred the petitioner from coram 
nobis relief because the petitioner had not exercised due diligence:  
the petitioner had known of the grounds for relief for over seven 
years, and during that time two government witnesses had died).  
However, we decline to decide these questions here and leave them 
for another day. 
  
shows the motion "is based on grounds of which he could not have had 
knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the 
circumstances prejudicial to the government occurred" (emphasis 
supplied)); Campas, 876 F.2d at 325 ("[T]he State in making its 
particularized showing of prejudice must relate its prejudice to the 
petitioner's delay and prove that the delay in filing was the cause 
of the State's prejudice."); Gutierrez, 839 F.2d at 652 (holding 
that a petitioner's delay is inexcusable only if "`based on grounds 
which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state 
occurred'" (quoting McDonnell v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 246, 251 (5th 
Cir. 1982))); see also, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 961 F.2d 
1339, 1342 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that laches applies to a § 2255 
proceeding if the delay was "inexcusable as well as prejudicial to 
the government"); Gutierrez, 839 F.2d at 650, 652 (stating that 
laches applies only if the government makes a particularized showing 
of prejudice and the petitioner's delay was inexcusable).  
Consequently, Nahodil would not face a heightened burden of proof 
upon remand even had he been dilatory. 
 
  
C. 
 We acknowledge that prejudice to the government's ability 
to retry the case is a factor which a district court considers when 
deciding a motion to withdraw the guilty plea.  See United States v. 
Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 712 (3d Cir. 1989).  However,  prejudice to the 
government's ability to bring a case to trial is not dispositive of 
a motion to withdraw the guilty plea if the original acceptance of 
the plea was improper or improvident.  See United States v. De 
Cavalcante, 449 F.2d 139, 141 (3d Cir. 1971) (stating that a guilty 
plea may be withdrawn for any reason that "seems fair and just"), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039, 92 S. Ct. 715 (1972).  At a minimum, "a 
motion to withdraw should be granted if the plea was not made 
voluntarily and intelligently."  8A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE ¶ 32.09[1], at 32-89 (1994); cf. United States v. Barker, 514 
F.2d 208, 221 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that a court should "almost 
always" allow the withdrawal of pleas which were entered unconstitu-
tionally or contrary to the provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013, 95 S. Ct. 2420 (1975); 
see also Hawthorne, 502 F.2d at 186-87. 
 Nahodil's instant motion is a § 2255 motion rather than a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Section 2255 is a proper medium 
for raising challenges to the voluntariness of a guilty plea after 
the judgment of sentence has been imposed.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Hawthorne, 502 F.2d 1183, 1186-87 (3d Cir. 1974).  At that 
juncture, the substantive standards are those applicable to the 
claims raised in the § 2255 motion (ineffective assistance of 
  
counsel in this case) rather than those which governed the claims 
raised at the principal proceedings (a motion to withdraw the plea 
in this case).  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d); United States v. 
Cannistraro, 734 F. Supp. 1110, 1119-20 (D.N.J.), aff'd without 
opinion, 919 F.2d 133 and 137 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 
916, 111 S. Ct. 2011 (1991).5 
 For the reasons we have articulated supra Part III.B, 
Vasquez expounds the germane inquiry in § 2255 motions as well as in 
§ 2254 proceedings.  Vasquez directs courts to evaluate a different, 
narrower conception of prejudice to the government than in context 
of a motion to withdraw a plea:  the court must examine simply 
whether the government can effectively frame an answer to the 
charges contained in the § 2255 motion.  See RULE 9(A) OF THE RULES 
GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS (permitting the government to move for 
dismissal if "it appears that the government has been prejudiced in 
its ability to respond to the motion by delay in its filing" 
(emphasis supplied)); Hannon v. Maschner, 845 F.2d 1553, 1556 (10th 
Cir. 1988) (holding that under Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing § 
2254 Proceedings, prejudice refers to prejudice in responding to the 
petition, not to prejudice in retrying the defendant).  Because, in 
the case sub judice, the government can respond to the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel despite the death of its key 
                     
    
5
.    We note that in the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, 
Nahodil did not raise the issues of the voluntariness of the plea 
and the violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel.  
Nahodil based his motion to withdraw the plea on the "fair and just" 
reasons that he was extremely reluctant to plead guilty and that he 
had proclaimed his innocence throughout. 
  
witness, it cannot oppose Nahodil's § 2255 motion by reference to 
prejudice on that ground.  See id.6 
 For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court 
summarily dismissing Nahodil's petition must be vacated and the case 
remanded for further proceedings.  If the district court should 
find, after the § 2255 hearing, that Nahodil's plea was involuntary 
because it resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel, it 
should vacate the plea despite the finding it made during the motion 
to withdraw the guilty plea proceeding that the government would be 
prejudiced in its ability to proceed to trial.  See Strader v. 
Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 1979) ("When the misadvice of 
the lawyer is so gross as to amount to a denial of the 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, leading 
the defendant to enter an improvident plea, striking the sentence 
and permitting a withdrawal of the plea seems only a necessary 
consequence of the deprivation of the right to counsel."); cf. 
United States v. Hernandez-Lebron, 23 F.3d 600, 607 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(advising the defendant to attempt to withdraw his guilty plea by 
raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a § 2255 
proceeding); United States v. Willis, 804 F.2d 961, 964 (6th Cir. 
1986) (same). 
 
                     
    
6
.    Incidentally, Nahodil claims, and the government does not 
dispute, that another percipient witness besides the deceased one 
was present in Nahodil's house at the time of the drug transaction.  
Br. of Appellant at 2-4; see also Br. of Appellant at 35-36, No. 92-
5002 (3d Cir. Mar. 2, 1992). 
  
IV. 
 In sum, this case is not one about which we can say that 
the motion, files, and record show conclusively that the movant is 
not entitled to relief, and hence we find that the district court 
abused its discretion by summarily dismissing Nahodil's § 2255 
motion.  We will therefore vacate the July 15, 1993 district court 
order and remand the case to the district court for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  Because of the complex issues 
presented, the district court should consider appointing counsel to 
represent Nahodil. 
